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 This paper was originally published in Inquiry, Volume 20, 1977, pages 67–81.
It is reprinted here with slight revisions. n reply to Gullvåg (Inquiry, Vol. 18, 1975), I concede that there are 
imitations to a pluralistic metaphilosophy. The limits are not, however, 
pecifiable. By increasing a philosophical system’s comprehensiveness, 
ne decreases its refutability; as the system becomes more 
omprehensive, it begins to incorporate its own rules of refutation and 
ther concepts required for assessing validity, but there are no definite 
imits to comprehensiveness. By increasing a system’s 
omprehensiveness one also diminishes the possibility of comparing 
hat system with others. There is a fairly neutral but vague and 
mprecise way of expressing oneself metaphysically, but such 
xpressions can never attain absolute neutrality. Nevertheless, it might 
e useful to retain, as a regulative idea, the notion that all 
omprehensive systems try to embrace the same single reality. 
ntroduction 
ngemund Gullvåg’s “Naess’s Pluralistic Metaphilosophy”1 is a fine 
xample of criticism which takes every care not to misrepresent the 
iews under examination. Gullvåg offers some usefully succinct 
ormulations of many aspects of these views and uses them to point to a 
umber of weaknesses in the views. In what follows, I shall gratefully 
ake some concessions and restate a way of thinking which I think 
mportant in itself and also in its consequences for the policy of 
hilosophy departments. 
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Typologies of systems have on the whole been post factum. They try to 
furnish a sufficiently broad frame of reference to accommodate existing 
specimens, not all future possible specimens. But even so, they may not 
be broad enough. Indian surveys of all systems, the 
sarvadarsanasmgrahas, show a dependence upon specific Indian 
frames, while Karl Jasper’s excellent typology manifests his 
psychological and existential leanings and can hardly be said to cover 
all Indian systems.2 The former reveals a certain narrowness of compass 
if we try to accommodate other than Indian systems, and the latter 
illustrates how the inventor of a typology tends to make presuppositions 
which totally exclude them from the sphere of valid (consistent, true, 
tenable) systems. 
 
A study of existing typologies suggests that it should be possible to 
construct wider and more neutral ones. More importantly, the higher the 
level of neutrality of the typology and the comprehensiveness of the 
system, the narrower the basis for establishing the invalidity of any of 
them. Propositions about philosophic systems in general presuppose an 
understanding of all systems. In my view this understanding can only 
reach certain approximations, because any understanding that occurs 
can do so only on the basis of a definite set of presuppositions, which 
cannot be brought into and out of play without altering the personality 
of the person whose understanding it is. My view, indecently, 
presupposes that concepts of understanding involve that of a person of 
some kind. 
 
Really Existing and Identifiable Objects 
Gullvåg writes: 
 
With respect to objects, Naess apparently takes a view that is strikingly 
similar to the ontological standpoint on particulars that Peirce accepted 
before he came, at a late stage in his philosophical development, to 
acknowledge them as existing and identifiable independently of conceptual 
frameworks. . . . My conclusion here is that if there is such a presupposition 
underlying Naess’s semantics and doctrine of systems, he has already 
deviated quite radically from the programme of system-neutrality.3
 
I hold that objects exist and are identifiable independently of concepts. With 
Moore I say I have two hands—for certain. I hold it to be objectively true. 
 
But all this I affirm, or rather admit, “on the T0-level”, that is, as point-of-
departure formulations which allow extremely different philosophical 
interpretations.4 Even philosophies which contain sentences such as “nothing 
exists” seems to hold that in certain senses something exists. I say “seem to”. 
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It may well be that some concepts of maya are such that in no sense can I 
imagine that I really and objectively have two hands. This would mean that I 
cannot understand certain maya philosophies, and that they are not taken 
account of in my typology. 
  
Earlier Gullvåg says: 
 
But I am not at all sure that Naess would want to accept such a picture of the 
world as sets of objects of different kinds, which are there independently of 
out conceptual systems and descriptions. Possibly he would reject it as not a 
system-neutral account of the relationship between system and reality. Or 
perhaps he would accept alternative accounts incompatible with the one just 
mentioned.5
 
This is also correct: when the T0-version of the object-independency 
formulation is made more precise, most or all plausible interpretations 
form highly unneutral philosophical statements—and sometimes false 
ones, so far as I can understand. I will, as Gullvåg indicates, include 
views incompatible with some of those precizations in my typology. 
The typology includes systems with I tend to regard as invalid or 
strange, but none that I feel to be utterly unintelligible. My hands may 
be unreal in many senses, but there is a (not easily described) limit to 
the degree of ontological unreality of my hands beyond which I would 
tend to say: “I do not follow; I cannot understand your position. 
Therefore I cannot take it into consideration in my typology.” I say this 
“undogmatically” (in Sextus Empiricus’s sense). I do not preclude the 
possibility that I will come to understand your position, and not 
understand that I did not understand. 
 
Neutral Semantics as a Tool in Systems Theory 
Gullvåg says that he thinks that “Naess’s notion of a ‘Kindergarten 
version’ of his semantics is programmatic rather than actualized in any 
exposition.”6
 
The semantics of my Communication and Argument7 can be given an 
exposition that is system neutral to an extremely high degree. This is, as 
Gullvåg indicates, a programme and a hypothesis. But the pluralistic 
meta-systematic theory makes use, I admit, of more precise versions. 
And the direction of precization is, presumably, not philosophically 
completely neutral. It is likely that metasystematic theory fails, to some 
extent, to fully reach the high level of neutrality intended. Readers can, 
with less effort than me, point out weaknesses. I can then try to 
reconstruct in order to avoid the specified weaknesses. But they must be 
shown before they can be eliminated. 
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Moderately Comprehensive, Moderately Precise Metatheory 
Again Gullvåg: 
 
Apparently, then, the pluralistic theory of systems cannot be a theory in any 
strict sense, that is, something that can in principle be evaluated with regard 
to truth, consistency, and entailments. Nor does Naess claim any such status 
for it. Some of his remarks suggest that his account of systems is a quasi-
theoretical attempt to show or indicate something that cannot, strictly 
speaking, be stated. It cannot strictly speaking be correct to say anything 
about systems in general.8
 
Yes, but there are less paradoxical levels of the metaphilosophy of 
systems. It must be borne in mind that there are two dimensions—more 
or less comprehensive systems, and more or less precise typological 
conceptual frameworks dealing with systems. Between the two there is 
a complementarity relation—the more precise the conceptual 
framework, the less comprehensive the typology. 
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Comprehensiveness  
 
The extreme difficulties arise when we try to combine an extreme 
degree of comprehensiveness with even a modest degree of 
preciseness—like typology C in the diagram. Or where, as with B, a 
considerable degree of preciseness is combined with even a modest 
degree of comprehensiveness. 
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How precise must a theory be in order to be a theory “in any strict 
sense”? Gestalt-theory and some other theories which have generated 
much insight never acquired any substantial level of interpersonal 
preciseness. The metaphilosophy of systems may also generate or help 
insight despite its low interpersonal preciseness. 
 
Systems: Absolutely or Relatively True—or Simply True? 
Gullvåg quotes me as saying: “A system can legitimately claim truth 
and intersubjective validity, not merely expediency or subjective 
appropriateness.”9
 
What I tried to convey was that metasystematic assertions of plurality 
do not invalidate or make assertions of the simple kind “p is true” 
meaningless. That would invalidate or make meaningless the assertion 
“p.” In other words, the so-called absolute concept of truth remains. 
Only, strictly speaking, there is not just one such concept. A rich variety 
will occur if made precise in relation to different ontologies. 
 
Furthermore, the substitution of “p is relatively true” or “p is true in 
relation to my system S” for “p is true” is of doubtful usefulness. If 
somebody calls a system “my system S,” S is not his total system. He 
administers typological concepts in such a way that he is able to place S 
within a class of different systems. Whatever his system, it is therefore 
wider than S. 
 
This implies that a metasystematic relativism of the kind I assert on the 
T0-level cannot be stated within a definite total system which is thereby 
relativized through assertions made by its own adherents. 
 
Reality as a Directive Idea: There Is Only One Reality 
In describing my views, Gullvåg says:  
 
The rules for the use of the term “reality” make the notion of reality a kind of 
regulative or directive idea. “Reality” is not a term that stands for a definite 
structure or substructure. Here, however, it is natural to ask: In what sense is 
the idea of reality a directive idea? Does it determine a direction? 
Apparently, it doesn’t determine anything, since it does not exclude anything, 
for different, mutually incompatible systems are equally valid in the sense of 
agreeing equally well with reality.10
 
The use of the term “real” is such that is determines a direction towards 
oneness. Reality is one. In advocating a definite view concerning reality 
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and trying to refute opposing views, I do not permit the intrusion of the 
idea that the other views concern another reality, a second or third 
reality, unrelated to each other. If related, then they are mere parts of a 
greater whole.  
  
A view may, of course, intend to cover a different part or aspect of 
reality from another view. If one philosopher says “this is reality,” the 
other “no, that,” a decision must be made in favour of only one of the 
possibilities, provided they can be shown to be different. If among 
philosophers we assert agreement about reality, we assume inevitably 
and correctly that it is the same reality we speak about. This also holds 
good when we speak of extremely different parts or aspects of reality. 
 
Concerning the Validity of Comprehensive Systems 
Gullvåg says: 
 
“According to Naess’s pluralistic metaphilosophy, different, mutually 
incompatible, all-encompassing systems are equally ‘valid or true’.”11
 
Yes, but a next step in the dialectical metaphilosophy of systems 
requires such utterances to be reformulated. 
  
(a) More accurately I would say that there are no decisive arguments 
against an all-encompassing (consistent) system, and that if anything is 
valid, such a system is valid. (“Consistency” must be thought of as 
being defined within the system.) 
  
(b) The formulation “different, mutually incompatible systems may 
agree equally well with reality” is of a moderate level of preciseness. 
The more comprehensive the system, the more difficult it is to make a 
systematic comparison, because more and more terms are defined 
within the system. This implies that hypotheses about incompatibility or 
compatibility have less and less basis for confirmation or 
disconfirmation. The degree of incomparability increases. Thus it is 
presumably more precise to say “different, mutually incompatible, or 
incomparable systems may agree with reality.” The term “equally well” 
suggests (wrongly) a kind of system-independent measure of 
agreement. Or we may use the following formulation: “There may be 
no adequate basis for a conclusion that one system agrees and another 
does not agree with reality, even if the systems are mutually 
incompatible.” 
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(c) All-encompassingness cannot be achieved without encountering 
grave logical problems. I would say “strict or absolute all-
encompassingness is impossible.” On the other hand, fruitful 
conceptions of “near-total” or “maximally encompassing system” are 
what are needed in metaphilosophy. The term “total-system” is only 
used on the T0-level, as is “total view.” 
 
(d) “Anything is possible” must also be taken as a point-of-departure 
formulation. It serves to stress a trend towards a greater tolerance of 
assumptions which postulate states of affairs that generally tend to be 
called impossible. 
 
If interpreted in an absolute way, the slogan implies “It is impossible 
that something is impossible.” This goes against my epistemology. I 
will not exclude the possibility that something is impossible. 
Transcendental philosophy, especially from the time of Kant, has 
proffered valuable hypotheses about impossibilities. 
 
Gullvåg’s paper is a valuable contribution to the unending process of 
correction and elaboration which metaphysical inquiry needs if it is to 
adapt to changing standards and contexts. 
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